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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a stockholder plaintiff claims that a corporate decision 
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, a court applying Delaware 
law searches for an independent, disinterested, and sufficiently 
informed decision maker.1 If one exists, then the court defers to 
the decision that the qualified decision maker made. Only in the 
absence of a qualified decision maker will the court assume that 
role for itself. 
This animating principle drives the selection of the standard of 
review that the court uses to determine whether a corporate 
 
        †   Vice Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. On 
October 8, 2013, Vice Chancellor Laster delivered the Dorsey & Whitney 
Foundation Lecture at William Mitchell College of Law. Portions of this article 
formed the basis for his remarks. 
 1.  To shorten the list of necessary attributes, this article refers to an 
independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker as a 
“qualified decision maker.” 
1
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fiduciary has breached its duties. Delaware law has three basic 
standards of review for evaluating fiduciary decision making: the 
business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. A 
court applying Delaware law moves among the standards 
depending on the degree to which a qualified decision maker 
exists. 
Delaware decisions explain how the standard of review 
escalates from the business judgment rule to entire fairness and 
back again. Delaware decisions similarly identify the specific 
situations that call for augmenting the standard of review from the 
business judgment rule to enhanced scrutiny. But Delaware cases 
address to a far lesser degree how the standard of review can 
diminish from enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule. 
As a matter of first principles, in a situation where enhanced 
scrutiny applies, stockholder approval by a disinterested, 
uncoerced, and fully informed stockholder majority should restore 
the business judgment rule. To the extent the board is 
compromised by the situational pressures that trigger enhanced 
scrutiny, the collective body of disinterested and informed 
stockholders should be able to act as a qualified decision maker to 
which a court would defer. This should be true even if stockholder 
approval was required under the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (DGCL) for the act to become effective.2 
To date, the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
this issue, and at least two Delaware Supreme Court decisions 
arguably indicate that an organic vote will not affect the standard of 
review when enhanced scrutiny applies. The Santa Fe3 opinion 
could be read to hold that an organic vote on a merger otherwise 
reviewable under enhanced scrutiny will not change the standard 
of review that governs defensive measures adopted separately or as 
 
 2.  For simplicity, this article uses the term “organic vote” to refer to a 
stockholder vote that is required under the DGCL for the corporate action to 
become effective. This article uses the term “voluntary vote” to refer to a 
stockholder vote that is not required for the corporate action to become effective. 
An example of the former is the vote on a long-form merger. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 251(b) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014). An example of the latter is 
the vote to adopt a stock option plan. See id. § 157. The adjective “organic” is 
suggested by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Geier, which 
referred to a statutorily required vote as part of the “organic act.” 671 A.2d 1368, 
1379 n.24 (Del. 1996).  
 3.  In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
2
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2014] EFFECT OF STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL 1445 
part of the merger agreement. The Gantler v. Stephens4 decision 
could be read to hold more broadly that an organic vote will never 
have any effect on the standard of review. 
A thorough examination of Santa Fe and Gantler reveals them 
to be part of a quarter-century effort by the Delaware courts to 
clarify confusion inadvertently created by loose language about 
stockholder ratification in Smith v. Van Gorkom.5 As Gantler makes 
clear, ratification is a narrow legal concept that comes into play 
when one decision maker has made a decision unilaterally. If the 
decision is challenged, a second decision maker with equal or 
greater authority can ratify the original decision by agreeing 
formally with the first decision maker. If a decision requires two 
approvals to be effective, then technically the second approval is 
not a form of ratification, but rather part of the original decision. 
Ratification, therefore, cannot strictly apply to an organic vote 
required under the DGCL for corporate action to become effective. 
In Gantler, the Delaware Supreme Court limited the use of the 
term “ratification” to its “classic” sense, namely, situations where 
one decision maker has made a decision unilaterally.6 The Gantler 
decision expressly overruled Van Gorkom to the extent it used the 
term “ratification” to refer to an organic vote, such as the 
stockholder vote on charter amendment or a long-form merger.7 
The high court incorporated Santa Fe into this more limited view of 
ratification and took pains to specify that its decision did not alter 
other aspects of stockholder approval jurisprudence, such as case 
law interpreting section 144 of the DGCL or decisions holding that 
only unanimous stockholder approval can validate acts of waste. In 
doing so, the Gantler decision sharpened the distinction drawn in 
Williams v. Geier8 between the doctrine of “classic” ratification, 
which applies to voluntary votes, and the concept of stockholder 
approval, which encompasses organic votes. As the Williams court 
 
 4.  965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 5.  488 A.2d 858, 889–90 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by Gantler, 965 A.2d. 
at 713 n.54. 
 6.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713. 
 7.  See id. at 713 n.54; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251 (Westlaw) 
(detailing amending certificates of incorporation after receipt of payment for 
stock, and mergers and consolidations, respectively). 
 8.  671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). 
3
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admonished, the former are “entirely different” from and “not 
relevant” to the latter.9 
Authorities on “classic” ratification, including Santa Fe and 
Gantler, simply do not speak to the separate issue of the effect that 
an organic vote has on the applicable standard of review. 
Consistent with the premise of deference to a qualified corporate 
decision maker, if a fully informed, uncoerced, and disinterested 
stockholder majority votes in favor of a merger otherwise subject to 
enhanced scrutiny, then the business judgment rule should 
become the operative standard of review. This should be true even 
when the stockholder approval comes from an organic vote. 
Consequently, any complaint challenging such a transaction should 
no longer benefit from enhanced scrutiny’s reasonableness 
standard or the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants. 
Instead, the plaintiff should be required to plead facts sufficient to 
overcome the business judgment rule’s presumptions. 
II. THREE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Delaware has three basic standards of review for evaluating 
decisions made by fiduciaries: the business judgment rule, 
enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. Together, they form a 
pyramid of narrowing deference to corporate decision making and 
increasing judicial intrusiveness. Travel aficionados can imagine a 
three-step Mayan pyramid. The gastronomically inclined can 
picture a three-tiered wedding cake. 
At the bottom of the pyramid is the business judgment rule, 
which gives the pyramid a capaciously broad foundation. For 
decisions at this level, a qualified corporate decision maker exists, 
so a reviewing court effectively abstains from reviewing the 
substance of the corporate decision.10 The only residuum for 
 
 9.  Id. at 1379 (distinguishing between (1) cases “where stockholders are 
called upon to ratify action which may involve a transaction with an interested 
director or where the transaction approved by the board may otherwise be 
voidable,” and (2) cases involving “the effect of corporate action which, in order to 
become operative, requires and receives both approval by the board of directors 
and the stockholders,” and “put[ting] to one side” the former category of cases as 
“not relevant” and “entirely different” when considering an organic vote under 
section 242 of the DGCL). 
 10.  In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados I), Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 
WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (noting that the business judgment 
rule is a principle of judicial nonreview that “reflects and promotes the role of the 
4
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judicial review is limited to decisions so irrational as to suggest bad 
faith.11 Irrationality is an extreme standard, making the bottom 
layer of the pyramid expansively wide. 
At the top of the pyramid is the narrowest tier, representing 
entire fairness. At this level, the plaintiff has shown that the board 
could not act as a qualified decision maker, so the court must use 
its own judgment. Under entire fairness, the defendant directors 
have the burden “to demonstrate that the challenged act or 
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”12 To meet this test, they must show that the action 
they took was both procedurally and substantively fair by 
establishing “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the 
product of both fair dealing and fair price.”13 “Not even an honest 
belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to 
establish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be 
objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”14 
 
board of directors as the proper body to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation”). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (exploring the necessary balance 
between authority and accountability in judicial review of operational business 
decisions).  
 11.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 52 
(Del. 2006) (“[W]here business judgment presumptions are applicable, the 
board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational 
business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 
(Del. 1971))); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality is the 
outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional 
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in 
good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.” (footnotes 
omitted)); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(explaining that unless one of the elements of the business judgment rule is 
rebutted, “the court merely looks to see whether the business decision made was 
rational in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s 
objectives”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (“A court may, however, review the substance of a business 
decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of 
assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable 
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad 
faith.”).  
 12.  Disney II, 906 A.2d at 52; accord Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 
91 (Del. 2001); see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.  
 13.  Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary IV), 663 A.2d 
1156, 1163 (Del. 1995). 
 14.  Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
5
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Even under entire fairness, however, a lingering degree of 
deference to the corporate decision maker remains, so the top level 
of the pyramid should be imagined as a narrow tier rather than a 
spire. “‘[P]erfection is not possible, or expected’ as a condition 
precedent to a judicial determination of entire fairness.”15 The 
board must act in a procedurally fair manner, but directors will not 
be held to have breached their duties simply because they failed to 
deploy an idealized level of protection. The same is true for the 
substantive terms of a transaction. “The value of a corporation is 
not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values . . . .”16 
Consequently, when conducting the fair price aspect of entire 
fairness, the court asks whether the transaction was one “that a 
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as 
within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably 
accept.”17 On both price and process, there is play in the joints, and 
the two dimensions are interrelated: “A strong record of fair 
dealing can influence the fair price inquiry, reinforcing the unitary 
nature of the entire fairness test. The converse is equally true: 
process can infect price.”18 These unavoidable ambiguities in the 
test, combined with the inherent vagaries of litigation and a natural 
reluctance to substitute judicial judgment for business persons’ 
decision making, preserve a de facto element of deference even 
under the entire fairness test.19 
Sandwiched between the top and bottom is a middle tier, 
representing enhanced scrutiny. “Enhanced scrutiny applies to 
specific, recurring, and readily identifiable situations involving 
 
 15.  Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d at 1179 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).  
 16.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Appraisal III), Civ. A. 
No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). 
 17.  Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary III), 663 A.2d 
1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156; see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 
Civ. A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) (“A fair price is 
a price that is within a range that reasonable men and women with access to 
relevant information might accept.”), rev’d on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 
(Del. 1997). 
 18.  Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 467 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 19.  See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243–44 (Del. 2012) 
(“[J]udicial review for entire fairness of how the transaction was structured, 
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and approved by the directors will be 
significantly influenced by the work product of a properly functioning special 
committee of independent directors.”). 
6
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potential conflicts of interest where the realities of the 
decisionmaking context can subtly undermine the decisions of 
even independent and disinterested directors.”20 Those conflicts 
are not sufficiently strong to trigger entire fairness, but they also do 
not comfortably permit business judgment deference.21 In those 
 
 20.  In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 
2013); accord Reis, 28 A.3d at 457–59; see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 180–82 (Del. 1986) (applying Unocal test to the 
sale of a corporation in light of concern that the directors rebuffed a premium 
acquisition offer and agreed to a white knight transaction, because (i) the target 
CEO felt a “strong personal antipathy” towards the acquirer, and (ii) the directors 
feared potential litigation by noteholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (creating enhanced scrutiny to address the 
“omnipresent specter” that when resisting a hostile takeover, target directors may 
be influenced by and act to further their own interests or those of incumbent 
management, “rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders”); see also 
In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[T]he 
potential sale of a corporation has enormous implications for corporate managers 
and advisors, and a range of human motivations, including but by no means 
limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than 
faithful . . . .”). The Delaware Supreme Court extended the rubric of enhanced 
scrutiny to incorporate the principles that animated Chancellor Allen’s decision in 
Blasius Industries and directed that they be applied “within the . . . enhanced 
standard of judicial review.” MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 
1129 (Del. 2003) (relying on Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 
(Del. Ch. 1988)); accord Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992). 
Commentators have argued that judicial review of the special litigation committee 
(SLC) process under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), is best 
understood as a form of enhanced scrutiny. See Gregory V. Varallo et al., From 
Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 BUS. LAW. 397, 
423 n.121 (1998) (explaining that the two-step Zapata test is “reminiscent of the 
enhanced scrutiny courts use to examine the actions of directors engaged in a sale 
of a corporation or other like transactions”); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the 
Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 851 (2004) (discussing standard 
and concluding that “Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal”). 
 21.  See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 
(Del. 1993) (“[T]here are rare situations which mandate that a court take a more 
direct and active role in overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by 
directors. In these situations, a court subjects the directors’ conduct to enhanced 
scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 
14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Avoiding a crude bifurcation of the world into 
two starkly divergent categories—business judgment rule review reflecting a policy 
of maximal deference to disinterested board decisionmaking and entire fairness 
review reflecting a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing decisions—the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s Unocal and Revlon decisions adopted a middle 
ground.”).  
7
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contexts, “the predicate question of what the board’s true 
motivation was comes into play,” and “[t]he court must take a 
nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests 
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board.”22 Framed 
generally, enhanced scrutiny requires that the defendant 
fiduciaries “bear the burden of persuasion to show that their 
motivations were proper and not selfish” and that “their actions 
were reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective.”23 
Reasonableness review is an objective standard, but not one 
that contemplates a single, “reasonable” answer. Rather, a court 
determines whether the challenged corporate decision falls within 
a reasonable range of objectively constrained discretion: 
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be 
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, 
not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several 
reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess 
that choice even though it might have decided otherwise 
or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their 
business judgment for that of the directors, but will 
determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, 
within a range of reasonableness.24 
The resulting standard creates a middle tier narrower than the 
rationality standard of the business judgment rule but broader than 
the entire fairness test.25 
III. SHIFTING BETWEEN THE STANDARDS 
In a corporation, generally speaking, there are two decision 
makers that potentially can address an issue: the board of directors 
and the stockholders.26 A court applying Delaware law determines 
 
 22.  Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598.  
 23.  Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 24.  QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.  
 25.  See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598 (“In that middle ground [of enhanced 
scrutiny], the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the 
board’s actions under a standard that is more stringent than business judgment 
review and yet less severe than the entire fairness standard. Moreover, the 
defendants themselves are allocated the burden to show that they acted 
reasonably.”). 
 26.  This article puts to the side the issue of whether a CEO or other senior 
manager qualifies for similar deference. Compare A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 
8
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the standard of review by examining to what degree a qualified 
decision maker exists at either or both levels. 
A. From the Business Judgment Rule, to Entire Fairness, and Back Again 
For a Delaware corporation, the DGCL designates the board of 
directors as the primary corporate decision maker. Section 141(a) 
provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”27 
“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the 
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 
141(a).”28 
The business judgment rule presumes that “in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”29 In other 
words, the business judgment rule presumes that the board served 
as a qualified decision maker, including that the directors were 
independent, disinterested, appropriately informed, and acted for 
a proper corporate purpose. “[T]he burden of pleading and proof 
 
48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992), and Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks 
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005), with Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the 
Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 456 (2005). 
 27.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014).  
 28.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven 
precedents, including Aronson, to the extent they reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by 
the Delaware Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or 
otherwise suggested deferential appellate review. Id. at 253 n.13 (overruling in 
part on this issue Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., 701 A.2d 70, 72–73 
(Del. 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. 
Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 
207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); Pogostin v. Rice, 
480 A.2d 619, 624–25 (Del. 1984); Aronson, 471 A.2d at 814). The Brehm court held 
that appellate review of a Rule 23.1 determination would be de novo and plenary. 
746 A.2d at 253. The seven partially overruled precedents otherwise remain good 
law. This article does not rely on any of them for the standard of appellate review 
and, therefore, omits the cumbersome subsequent history. 
 29.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 
124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. 
Ch. 1924)).  
9
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is on the party challenging the decision to allege facts to rebut the 
presumption.”30 Each element of the business judgment rule has its 
own test. 
To rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of care, a 
plaintiff must plead and later prove gross negligence.31 When 
considering whether a lack of care is sufficient to rebut the business 
judgment rule, “[c]ourts do not measure, weigh or quantify 
directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable 
in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process 
due care only.”32 
To show a lack of disinterestedness sufficient to rebut the 
business judgment rule, a plaintiff must plead and later prove that 
a director received “a personal financial benefit from a transaction 
that is not equally shared by the stockholders.”33 A plaintiff also can 
show that a director has a compromising interest by pleading and 
later proving that the director is a dual fiduciary and owes a 
competing duty of loyalty to an entity that itself stands on the other 
side of the transaction or that will receive a unique benefit not 
shared with the stockholders.34 To show a lack of independence, a 
 
 30.  Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1111–12 (Del. Ch. 1999) (citing 
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812), aff’d, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000).  
 31.  See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259.  
 32.  Id. at 264. 
 33.  Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted); 
accord Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary II), 634 A.2d 345, 362 
(Del. 1993) (“Classic examples of director self-interest in a business transaction 
involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director 
receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the shareholders 
generally.”); Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624 (“Directorial interest exists whenever . . . a 
director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit 
from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the 
stockholders.”). “[A] subjective ‘actual person’ standard [is used] to determine 
whether a ‘given’ director was likely to be affected in the same or similar 
circumstances.” McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del. 2000) (citing 
Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995)). 
[T]he benefit received by the director and not shared with 
stockholders must be “of a sufficiently material importance, in the 
context of the director’s economic circumstances, as to have made it 
improbable that the director could perform her fiduciary duties . . . 
without being influenced by her overriding personal interest.” 
Trados I, Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) 
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 
1999)). 
 34.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that 
10
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plaintiff must show that a director is sufficiently loyal to, beholden 
to, or otherwise influenced by an interested party to undermine the 
director’s ability to judge the matter on its merits.35 
A plaintiff also may seek to rebut the presumption that a 
director acted subjectively for the proper corporate purpose of 
serving the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 
 
officers of parent corporation faced conflict of interest when acting as subsidiary 
directors regarding transaction with parent); accord Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. 
Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1336 (Del. Ch. 1987) (same); see also Trados I, 2009 
WL 2225958, at *8 (treating directors as interested for pleading purposes in 
transaction that benefited preferred stockholders when “each had an ownership 
or employment relationship with an entity that owned Trados preferred stock”). 
 35.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (stating that one way to allege successfully that 
an individual director is under the control of another is by pleading “such facts as 
would demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are 
beholden to the controlling person”); Friedman v. Beningson, Civ. A. No. 12232, 
1995 WL 716762, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1995) (“The requirement that directors 
exercise independent judgment, (insofar as it is a distinct prerequisite to business judgment 
review from a requirement that directors exercise financially disinterested judgment), directs 
a court to an inquiry into all of the circumstances that are alleged to have 
inappropriately affected the exercise of board power. This inquiry may include the 
subject whether some or all directors are ‘beholden’ to or under the control, 
domination or strong influence of a party with a material financial interest in the 
transaction under attack, which interest is adverse to that of the corporation.”). 
Classic examples involve familial relationships, such as a parent’s love for and 
loyalty to a child. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 889 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (“That Hudson also happens to be Huizenga’s brother-in-law 
makes me incredulous about Hudson’s impartiality. Close familial relationships 
between directors can create a reasonable doubt as to impartiality. The plaintiff 
bears no burden to plead facts demonstrating that directors who are closely 
related have no history of discord or enmity that renders the natural inference of 
mutual loyalty and affection unreasonable.”); Chaffin v. GNI Grp., Civ. A. 
No. 16211-NC, 1999 WL 721569, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 1999) (holding that 
father-son relationship was sufficient to rebut presumption of independence and 
observing that “[i]nherent in the parental relationship is the parent’s natural 
desire to help his or her child succeed” and “most parents would find it highly 
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a completely neutral, disinterested position 
on an issue, where his or her own child would benefit substantially if the parent 
decides the issue a certain way”); see also London v. Tyrrell, Civ. A. No. 3321-CC, 
2010 WL 877528, at *14 n.60 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[I]n the pre-suit demand 
context, plaintiffs can often meet their burden of establishing a lack of 
independence with a simple allegation of a familial relationship. Surely then . . . it 
will be nigh unto impossible for a corporation bearing the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that an SLC member is independent in the face of plaintiffs’ 
allegation that the SLC member and a director defendant have a family 
relationship.”). 
11
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“[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the 
corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest 
possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not 
shared by the stockholders generally.”36 The presumption of good 
faith can be rebutted by a showing that the directors failed to 
pursue the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.37 
Bad faith, which is a subsidiary element of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty,38 encompasses both “an intent to harm but also intentional 
dereliction of duty.”39 
“A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .”40 
 
 36.  Technicolor Plenary II, 634 A.2d at 361.  
 37.  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 760–79 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (conducting a director-by-director analysis to determine if the 
individual members of the board, none of whom were directly interested in the 
hiring or termination of corporation’s President, acted in bad faith), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also Disney II, 906 A.2d at 53 (“Our law clearly permits 
a judicial assessment of director good faith for that former purpose [of rebutting 
the business judgment rule].”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 
A.3d 1, 40 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Under Delaware law, when a plaintiff demonstrates 
the directors made a challenged decision in bad faith, the plaintiff rebuts the 
business judgment rule presumption, and the burden shifts to the directors to 
prove that the decision was entirely fair to the corporation and its stockholders.”). 
 38.  Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006). 
 39.  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009); accord 
Disney II, 906 A.2d at 64–66 (defining “subjective bad faith” as “conduct motivated 
by an actual intent to do harm,” which “constitutes classic, quintessential bad 
faith,” and “intentional dereliction of duty” as “a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities”); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding, in the context of an 
oversight claim, that “utter[] fail[ure] to implement any reporting or information 
system or controls,” or “having implemented such a system or controls, 
conscious[] fail[ure] to monitor or oversee its operations” demonstrated “a 
conscious disregard” for their fiduciary responsibilities).  
 40.  Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67; accord Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (“A failure to act in 
good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a 
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .”); 
see also Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(defining a “bad faith” transaction as one “that is authorized for some purpose 
other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate welfare or is known to 
constitute a violation of applicable positive law” (emphasis omitted)); In re RJR 
Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *1159 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 31, 1989) (explaining that the business judgment rule would not protect “a 
fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated (even 
12
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“It makes no difference the reason why the director intentionally 
fails to pursue the best interests of the corporation.”41 Bad faith can 
be the result of “any . . . emotion [that] may cause a director to 
[intentionally] place his own interests, preferences or appetites 
before the welfare of the corporation,” including greed, “hatred, 
lust, envy, revenge, . . . shame or pride.”42 
To change the standard of review from the business judgment 
rule to entire fairness, a plaintiff must show that there were not 
enough independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed 
individuals who acted in good faith when making the challenged 
decision to constitute a board majority.43 If a board is evenly divided 
between compromised and noncompromised directors, then the 
plaintiff has succeeded in rebutting the business judgment rule.44 
In selecting a majority as the requisite number, the Delaware 
Supreme Court recognized that it had to draw a line and made a 
conscious policy decision.45 It is, therefore, not sufficient for a 
plaintiff to show that a minority of the board was compromised.46 
 
one in which he had no financial interest) for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of 
the corporation’s best interests”). 
 41.  Disney I, 907 A.2d at 754; see Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that “regardless of his motive, a director who consciously 
disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal 
judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes,” even if for a reason 
“other than personal pecuniary interest”). 
 42.  RJR Nabisco, Inc., 1989 WL 7036, at *1159; see Guttman v. Huang, 
823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The reason for the disloyalty (the 
faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or 
nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation’s best interest does not make 
it faithful, as opposed to faithless.”). 
 43.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that if “the 
transaction is not approved by a majority consisting of the disinterested directors, 
then the business judgment rule has no application”).  
 44.  See Gentile v. Rossette, Civ. A. No. 20213-VCN, 2010 WL 2171613, at *7 
n.36 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010) (“A board that is evenly divided between conflicted 
and non-conflicted members is not considered independent and disinterested.”); 
see also Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1046 n.8 (Del. 2004) (noting for demand futility purposes that a board 
evenly divided between interested and disinterested directors could not exercise 
business judgment on a demand); Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (same). 
 45.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 n.8 (“We recognize that drawing the line at a 
majority of the board may be an arguably arbitrary dividing point.”). 
 46.  The exception is where a minority of the directors faces a material 
conflict of interest or other loyalty issue and fail to disclose their compromised 
13
Laster: The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1456 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
Consequently, to determine whether to escalate from the 
business judgment rule to entire fairness, a court counts heads.47 If 
a director-by-director analysis leaves insufficient directors to make 
up a board majority, then the board cannot act as the qualified 
decision maker, and the court will review the board’s decision for 
entire fairness. To reverse that process and reestablish the business 
judgment rule, the defendants must show that despite the failures 
identified by the plaintiff, there actually was a qualified decision 
maker, such as a board committee or the fully informed 
stockholders. 
If a board of directors lacks an independent and disinterested 
majority, then the standard of review will de-escalate from entire 
fairness if the board exercised its authority under section 141(c) to 
empower a committee of independent and disinterested directors 
to make the relevant decision.48 If the board delegates its full power 
to address an issue to a committee, then the judicial search for a 
qualified decision maker shifts from the board to the committee. 
The same principles that govern the inquiry at the board level 
apply at the committee level, and the court will determine whether 
there were sufficient directors who voted in favor of the decision to 
make up a disinterested, independent, and informed majority of 
the committee. So long as the board has not retained some residual 
approval right or otherwise limited the committee’s authority, in 
which case the board’s retention of a portion of its authority 
undermines the committee’s ability to decide the issue and keeps 
the judicial focus on the board, then a decision made by a 
disinterested, independent, and informed majority of the 
committee receives business judgment deference.49 
 
status to the other directors. See Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 
(Del. 1995). Under those circumstances, the other directors are not able to take 
into account the directors’ conflicted status and become compromised themselves 
because they are not sufficiently informed. 
 47.  See Technicolor Plenary II, 634 A.2d 345, 361, 364 (Del. 1993) (requiring 
director-by-director analysis); Disney II, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (affirming 
director-by-director analysis); cf. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 
2002) (explaining that materiality is required for a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
but not for a violation of section 144 of the DGCL).  
 48.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 
2014); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 
(Del. 1991) (“The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of 
some neutral decision-making body.”).  
 49.  See In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, 
14
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More importantly for present purposes, a compromised board 
can substitute the stockholders as the necessary qualified decision 
maker and, thereby, restore the protections of the business 
judgment rule. This alternative does not imply that an up-or-down 
vote by stockholders is the functional equivalent of the careful, 
deliberative investigation into and weighing of alternatives that 
should be the hallmarks of a board’s decision-making process. 
Rather, it recognizes that the stockholders collectively are well-
positioned to decide whether to endorse what the board did, and 
that for purposes of determining how easy it should be for a 
stockholder plaintiff to challenge the action taken by the board 
(i.e., to determine the standard of review), a court should take into 
account and defer to an uncoerced endorsement from fully 
informed, disinterested stockholders.50 
There is also an important caveat as to the legal implications of 
stockholder approval, which can have a variety of effects. A 
stockholder vote can validate an insufficiently authorized act that 
otherwise would be voidable.51 It also provides one of the statutory 
 
at *27 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000); see also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 
(Del. Ch. 1971). 
 50.  There is a gut-level sense of fairness to this result. If the fully informed 
stockholders conclude collectively that they want an outcome, why should self-
appointed stockholder plaintiffs be able to seek to hold directors liable for a 
decision that a majority of the stockholders endorsed? Absent disclosure violations 
or coercion, there is something contradictory about stockholders collectively 
saying, “Yes, I want this merger” and then for the stockholder plaintiffs to seek 
damages from the directors for having approved the deal and recommended it to 
the stockholders in the first place. An alternative means of addressing this concern 
would be to exclude consenting stockholders from the class, but that approach 
would be inconsistent with the democratic concept of majority rule. Rather than 
the stockholder vote acting as a vote, it would operate as a class action opt-out 
mechanism. To give effect to the vote qua vote (i.e., as a mechanism for 
democratic decision making), the vote must also have some effect on the 
dissenters. My thanks go to David McBride for raising these points. 
 51.  Under Delaware law, insufficiently authorized acts can be either void or 
voidable. A void act is an action that is beyond the power of the corporation under 
any circumstances. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979) 
(distinguishing between void and voidable acts); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 
A.2d 1098, 1114 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Void acts are those acts that the board, or more 
generally the corporation, has no implicit or explicit authority to undertake or 
those acts that are fundamentally contrary to public policy.”). A voidable act is one 
that the corporation as an entity has the power to accomplish, but which the 
decision maker approving the transaction lacked the power to effectuate under 
the corporation’s bylaws, certificate of incorporation, or the DGCL. See Harbor 
15
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safe harbors established by section 144 of the DGCL.52 And even 
when the subject matter is limited to the standard of review for a 
fiduciary challenge, stockholder approval can have different 
consequences depending on pertinent factors, such as whether the 
underlying claim alleges a breach of the duty of loyalty or care, and 
whether the corporation has a controlling stockholder or de facto 
controller.53 Cases have also touched on the key difference 
addressed here: whether there should be a distinction between an 
organic vote and a voluntary vote. 
But what has never been disputed is the effectiveness of so-
called “classic” ratification in defeating a stockholder plaintiff’s 
 
Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 896 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining that 
voidable acts are ones that “the corporation can lawfully accomplish . . . if it does 
so in the appropriate manner”). “The practical distinction, for our purposes, is 
that voidable acts are susceptible to cure by [majority] shareholder approval while 
void acts are not.” Michelson, 407 A.2d at 219. I have added the word “majority” to 
the quotation from Michelson because it is customarily said (and the Michelson 
decision later noted) that certain categories of void acts, such as waste or matters 
that are ultra vires, can be approved by unanimous stockholder vote. See id. (“It is 
only where a claim of gift or waste of assets, fraud or [u]ltra vires is asserted that a 
less than unanimous shareholder ratification is not a full defense.”). To my mind, 
the latter is more akin to universal acquiescence by all possible stockholder 
plaintiffs. The act remains void, but there is no one left to challenge it. 
 52.  At common law, an interested transaction between the corporation and 
one of its directors or officers was voidable. Blake Rohrbacher et al., Finding Safe 
Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719 
(2008). Section 144 was adopted to “rescue” such transactions “from per se 
voidability under the common law.” Id. at 720. Section 144 deals solely with the 
“problem of per se invalidity; that is, as addressing only the common law principle 
that interested transactions were entirely invalid and providing a road map for 
transactional planners to avoid that fate.” In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614–15 (Del. Ch. 2005). The separate determination of “when 
an interested transaction might give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty—
i.e., to a claim in equity—was left to the common law of corporations to answer.” 
Id. at 615. Notwithstanding its narrow purpose, and likely because approval by 
disinterested and independent directors, or by disinterested and independent 
stockholders, can be relevant to the common law fiduciary duty analysis, section 
144 has “been misconstrued to provide business-judgment protection to 
transactions complying with its terms.” Rohrbacher, supra, at 746; see also id. 
at 741–46 (discussing cases interpreting section 144 beyond its limited scope). 
This overextension of section 144 is problematic because the standards for 
director approval and stockholder ratification under section 144 differ from the 
common law of fiduciary duty. See id. at 737–39. 
 53.  See infra Part III. 
16
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claim for breach of fiduciary duty.54 If the board makes a business 
decision on an issue within its authority and submits the matter to 
the stockholders for a voluntary vote, and if the stockholder vote is 
fully informed and noncoerced, then the resulting stockholder 
approval not only causes the business judgment rule to protect the 
board’s decision, but also has the additional effect of barring a 
stockholder plaintiff from seeking to rebut the presumptions of the 
business judgment rule.55 Under those circumstances, a court only 
will look to whether the decision served some rational business 
purpose, and because the stockholders already have approved it, a 
plaintiff will find it difficult to convince a court that no rational 
person could agree with the board’s judgment.56 In those 
circumstances, the stockholders collectively function as the 
qualified decision maker to which the reviewing court defers.57 
 
 54.  See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig. (Wheelabrator II), 
663 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 55.  See id. at 1200 (holding that “(1) the effect of the informed shareholder 
vote was to extinguish the plaintiffs’ due care claim; (2) that vote did not operate 
either to extinguish the duty of loyalty claim (as defendants contend), or to shift 
to the plaintiffs the burden of proving that the merger was unfair (as plaintiffs 
contend); and (3) the effect of the shareholder vote in this case is to invoke the 
business judgment standard, which limits review to issues of gift or waste with the 
burden of proof resting upon the plaintiffs”). 
 56.  See Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 895, 901 (questioning “the vestigial 
right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed, uncoerced 
independent stockholders approved by a non-unanimous vote was wasteful” and 
offering several convincing reasons that the doctrine has lost its utility, including 
the difficulty of “prov[ing] a waste or gift claim in the face of a decision by fully 
informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders to ratify the transaction,” given 
that “[t]he test for waste is whether any person of ordinary sound business 
judgment could view the transaction as fair”); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 612 
(Del. Ch. 1962) (observing that stockholder vote approving transaction was 
“[s]urely . . . some indication” that terms of transaction were reasonable). 
 57.  This article discusses the concept of stockholder approval in terms of a 
stockholder vote, which is the typical context in which the issue arises. 
Stockholders also can consent to a transaction by tendering their shares. 
See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 842 (Del. 1987) (equating the 
act of “vot[ing] in favor of a merger” with tendering and “accept[ing] the benefits 
of the transaction”). If the first-step tender offer in a two-step transaction is 
conditioned on tenders of a majority of the outstanding shares, and if sufficient 
stockholders tender to satisfy the condition, then it should have the same effect as 
an affirmative stockholder vote. See In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. 
A. No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) (“Tendering, 
of course, is a substitute for shareholder vote.”); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. 
BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 294 (Del. Ch. 1998) (recognizing that 
17
Laster: The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1460 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
B. The Special Case of a Controlling Stockholder 
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized a situation-
specific exception to the general principle that the business 
judgment rule is rebutted by counting heads to determine if a 
qualified board majority exists. If the challenged transaction 
confers a unique benefit on a majority stockholder or other party 
that exercises de facto control over the corporation, then that 
decisional context triggers “the entire fairness standard ab initio.”58 
The presence of a controller creates a special case because the 
controller’s influence operates at both the board and stockholder 
levels. It is not uncommon for a controller to nominate a majority 
of the corporation’s directors. Agents, employees, and other 
fiduciaries of the controller, who serve on the corporation’s board, 
face a conflict of interest arising from their respective dual 
fiduciary statuses.59 The controller’s influence also undercuts the 
independence of otherwise independent and disinterested 
directors, because the controller has the power to determine 
whether those individuals will remain directors.60 At the stock-
holder level, the controller can simply dictate the outcome of a 
vote.61 
 
stockholders were, as a practical matter, “being asked to decide to approve the sale 
of their corporation as a part of their decision whether or not to tender shares in 
the first-step tender offer”). 
 58.  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 (Del. 2001); accord Kahn v. 
Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994). 
 59.  See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); 
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952). 
 60.  See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 (“[I]n a merger between the corporation and 
its controlling stockholder—even one negotiated by disinterested, independent 
directors—no court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully 
approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm’s 
length negotiation.”). But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815–16 (Del. 1984) 
(presuming that independent directors are capable of exercising a disinterested 
business judgment in deciding whether to cause the company to sue a controlling 
stockholder). 
 61.  See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 
(Del. 1993) (“[S]tockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where 
there is a majority stockholder. For example, minority stockholders can be 
deprived of a continuing equity interest in their corporation by means of a cash-
out merger. Absent effective protective provisions, minority stockholders must rely 
for protection solely on the fiduciary duties owed to them by the directors and the 
majority stockholder, since the minority stockholders have lost the power to 
influence corporate direction through the ballot.” (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/8
 
2014] EFFECT OF STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL 1461 
Because the controller’s influence operates at both the board 
and stockholder levels, neither a special committee nor a majority-
of-the-minority vote, standing alone, is sufficient to sterilize the 
controller’s influence and reestablish the presence of a qualified 
decision maker. A special committee alone is not sufficient because 
of the controller’s influence over the members of the committee, 
whom the controller can remove using its stockholder-level 
authority. The controller also has special negotiating advantages, 
such as the ability to obtain information about the corporation 
through its agents and employees on the board or simply through 
its status as a dominant stockholder, the opportunity to time any 
transactional proposal advantageously, and the power to use its 
stockholder voting power or other rights to veto transactional 
alternatives to the controller’s chosen transaction.62 If push comes 
to shove, the controller has the ability to neutralize or bypass the 
committee by using its board majority to push the transaction 
through or by taking a transaction directly to the stockholders.63 
An independent stockholder vote, implemented through, for 
example, a condition that a transaction with the controller be 
approved by a majority of the unaffiliated minority stockholders, is 
also not sufficient. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that 
 
at 703)). 
 62.  See, e.g., Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1103, 
1107 (Del. 1985) (permitting fairness challenge to merger based on controller’s 
allegedly unfair manipulation of the timing of the transaction); Weinberger, 
457 A.2d at 711 (noting that factors affecting fairness include “questions of when 
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to 
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were 
obtained”); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 617 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (positing that the entire fairness standard for controlling stockholder 
transactions rests on “a sincere concern that mergers with controlling stockholders 
involve an extraordinary potential for the exploitation by powerful insiders of 
their informational advantages and their voting clout”). 
 63.  See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1118 (noting that the controller threatened 
“to proceed with an unfriendly tender offer at a lower price” if the committee did 
not agree to a negotiated transaction); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. 
No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001) (noting that 
controller made no-premium exchange offer after failing to reach agreement with 
special committee over premium cash offer); see also In re Ocean Drilling & 
Exploration Co. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 30, 1991) (noting that special committee rejected merger proposal as 
unfair, and controller later proceeded with unilateral two-step freeze out that 
special committee recommended against in this pre-Kahn case). 
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minority stockholders face a threat of implicit coercion when 
voting on a controlling stockholder’s proposal such that they 
cannot act freely and independently in the face of the controller: 
Parent subsidiary mergers . . . are proposed by a party 
that controls, and will continue to control, the 
corporation, whether or not the minority stockholders 
vote to approve or reject the transaction. The controlling 
stockholder relationship has the potential to influence, 
however subtly, the . . . minority stockholders in a manner 
that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a 
noncontrolling party. 
Even where no coercion is intended, share-
holders . . . might perceive that their disapproval could 
risk retaliation of some kind by the controlling 
stockholder. For example, the controlling stockholder 
might decide to stop dividend payments or to effect a 
subsequent cash out merger at a less favorable price, for 
which the remedy would be time consuming and costly 
litigation. At the very least, the potential for that 
perception, and its possible impact upon a shareholder 
vote, could never be fully eliminated.64 
Even accepting that the minority stockholders can reject a 
controller’s proposal, collective action problems prevent diffuse 
minority stockholders from bargaining affirmatively for better 
terms.65 
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that using either 
a special committee or a majority-of-the-minority vote provides 
some procedural protections and, therefore, warrants some change 
in the standard of review. But the high court has held that using 
only one of the protections will not restore the business judgment 
rule. Rather, the effect of using only one such device is to shift the 
burden of proof on the issue of fairness so that, instead of the 
defendants having to prove fairness, the plaintiffs have to prove 
unfairness.66 
 
 64.  Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 (quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)). 
 65.  Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 618 (“The active agency of centralized 
management to test the market and bargain is not something that the 
stockholders can do for themselves.”). 
 66.  Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382 (Del. 1996) (citing Rosenblatt v. 
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985)); see Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116–17. 
Recent case law has minimized the importance of the burden shift. See, e.g., Ams. 
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To reestablish the presence of a sufficiently qualified decision 
maker to restore business judgment deference, the controller must 
take affirmative steps, at the outset of the transaction process, to 
remove the potential taint at both the board and the stockholder 
levels. This requires that the transaction be both (1) negotiated 
and approved by a fully authorized special committee of 
independent directors and (2) conditioned on an affirmative vote 
of a majority of the minority stockholders. If the transaction 
incorporates both protections from the outset, then the business 
judgment standard of review presumptively applies.67 This 
combination of requirements is designed “to mirror both elements 
of an arms’ length merger, viz. approval by disinterested directors 
and approval by disinterested stockholders.”68 “If the transaction 
does not incorporate both protective devices, or if a plaintiff can 
plead particularized facts sufficient to raise a litigable question 
about the effectiveness of one of the devices, then the transaction 
[remains] subject to entire fairness review.”69 
C. Moving In and Out of Enhanced Scrutiny 
Enhanced scrutiny, Delaware’s intermediate standard of 
review, is triggered by specific, readily identifiable situations in 
which the realities of the decision-making context can subtly 
undermine the decisions of even independent and disinterested 
directors. The Delaware Supreme Court first recognized the need 
for enhanced scrutiny in situations when a board resists a hostile 
takeover. In that scenario, there is an “omnipresent specter” that 
 
Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012) (“The failure to shift 
the burden is not outcome determinative under the entire fairness standard of 
review. . . . [T]he only ‘modest’ effect of the burden shift is to make the plaintiff 
prove unfairness under a preponderance of the evidence standard . . . .”). An 
alternative approach that could further harmonize and simplify Delaware law 
would be for the Delaware Supreme Court to hold that using a single protective 
device lowers the standard of review one step from entire fairness to enhanced 
scrutiny, with the burden of proof remaining on the defendants to show that they 
achieved an outcome falling within a range of reasonableness. Using two 
protective devices would continue to lower the standard of review two steps from 
entire fairness to the business judgment rule. 
 67.  In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d, 
– A.3d –, 2014 WL 996270 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 412–13 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606).  
 68.  CNX Gas, 4 A.3d at 412 (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606).  
 69.  Id. at 413 (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606). 
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target directors may be influenced by and act to further their own 
interests or those of incumbent management, “rather than those of 
the corporation and its shareholders.”70 
Directors facing a proxy contest have a similar positional 
conflict. 
A candidate for office, whether as an elected official or as 
a director of a corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected 
rather than defeated. He therefore has a personal interest 
in the outcome of the election even if the interest is not 
financial and he seeks to serve from the best of motives.71 
Enhanced scrutiny also applies in other situations where the law 
provides stockholders with a right to vote and the directors take 
action that intrudes on the space allotted for stockholder decision 
making.72 
Final-stage transactions for stockholders provide another 
situation where enhanced scrutiny applies.73 Final-stage transactions 
give rise to what economists refer to as the last period problem. 
Simply put, in a situation where parties expect to have 
repeated transactions, the recognition that a party who 
cheats in one transaction will be penalized by the other 
party in subsequent transactions reduces the incentive to 
cheat. However, when a transaction is the last (or only) in 
a series—that is, the final period—the incentive to cheat 
reappears because, by definition, the penalty for doing so 
has disappeared.74 
In the corporate context, the ability of managers to shirk or 
self-deal ordinarily is constrained not only by legal duties but also 
by a range of markets, including the product markets, capital 
 
 70.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 71.  Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 72.  See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 804–10 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(discussing the application of enhanced scrutiny to board action affecting 
stockholder voting); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., Civ. A. No. 17637, 
2000 WL 1805376, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (applying enhanced scrutiny 
to meeting adjournment that kept polls open for vote on increasing shares 
allocated to stock option plan). 
 73.  See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 74.  RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 720 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). See 
generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1942–53 (2003) (describing divergence of interests 
resulting from the last period problem). 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/8
 
2014] EFFECT OF STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL 1465 
markets, employment markets, and the market for corporate 
control. But when managers are in their final period, market 
consequences have less traction, making managers more likely to 
favor their own interests. In connection with a final-stage 
transaction, 
the target corporation’s board and management may 
demand side payments from the acquiror, thus effectively 
diverting a portion of the merger consideration from the 
shareholders to the management team. If the manage-
ment team is able to protect the self-serving transaction 
with deal protection provisions, it will be further insulated 
from the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate 
control, leaving the outgoing management team free to 
serve their own self-interest with relative impunity. 
In addition to the unrestrained pursuit of their own 
self-interest, directors and managers in the last period 
may depart from the best interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders due to a variety of non-pecuniary, but 
equally selfish, motivations. Directors and managers may 
favor one deal over another because it is more in line with 
their self image and view of the world or because it is 
more likely to cause them to be remembered fondly by 
employees or the business press.75 
The Delaware courts have held that at least three types of final-
stage transactions carry the risk of subtle conflicts warranting 
enhanced scrutiny: “a cash sale, a break-up, or a transaction like a 
change of control that fundamentally alters ownership rights.”76 
The Delaware Supreme Court also has held that the defensive 
aspects of a stock-for-stock merger agreement warrant enhanced 
scrutiny.77 
Only one Delaware Court of Chancery decision has held that 
an organic vote on a merger lowers the standard of review from 
enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule.78 Nevertheless, as 
 
 75.  Griffith, supra note 74, at 1947. 
 76.  See, e.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings L.L.C., 5 A.3d 1008, 1019 (Del. Ch. 
2010). 
 77.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934–36 
(Del. 2003) (applying enhanced scrutiny to deal protection devices). 
 78.  In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(holding that fully informed stockholder vote on a merger triggered business 
judgment standard of review resulting in dismissal of claim that the directors of a 
corporation breached their duty of care in selling the corporation). 
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a matter of first principles, this makes sense. The stockholder 
collective functions as a qualified decision maker to which a court 
applying Delaware law should give deference. Nor should it matter 
whether the vote is voluntary or organic. As discussed, an organic 
vote lowers the standard of review from entire fairness to the 
business judgment rule when the corporation does not have a 
controlling stockholder or de facto controller.79 An organic vote 
should have the same effect for enhanced scrutiny, which is a less 
intrusive, intermediate standard of review. 
The Delaware Supreme Court precedent that most strongly 
supports this view is Stroud v. Grace.80 The Stroud decision involved a 
family-owned, privately held Delaware corporation, Milliken 
Enterprises, Inc.81 Two different family factions had competing 
visions for Milliken. A faction that controlled a majority of the 
corporation’s outstanding voting power proposed a package of 
charter and bylaw amendments that, among other things, imposed 
qualifications for service as a director and advanced notice 
requirements for stockholder-nominated candidates.82 Nine of 
Milliken’s ten directors, including five out of six outside directors 
(unaffiliated with either faction) approved the amendments.83 At 
the Milliken annual meeting, 97.8% of the shares entitled to vote 
were present, and 78.0% of the outstanding shares approved the 
amendments.84 The minority faction—the Strouds—challenged the 
amendments, contending that they should be reviewed under the 
enhanced scrutiny test and that the board had breached its 
 
 79.  See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 890 (Del. Ch. 1999); 
Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“As long as ‘[the 
directors] act in good faith, with honest motives, for honest ends,’ the exercise of 
their discretion will not be interfered with. . . . The same presumption of fairness 
that supports the discretionary judgment of the managing directors must also be 
accorded to the majority of stockholders whenever they are called upon to speak 
for the corporation in matters assigned to them for decision, as is the case at one 
stage of the proceedings leading up to a sale of assets or a merger.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 80.  606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
 81.  Id. at 79. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 80.  
 84.  Id. at 80–81.  
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fiduciary duties.85 The Delaware Court of Chancery granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.86 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding that enhanced scrutiny did 
not apply. In doing so, the Delaware Supreme Court gave 
dispositive effect to the stockholder vote. As the high court 
explained, “[i]nherent in [enhanced scrutiny] is a presumption 
that a board acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote 
ratifying the challenged action.”87 Importantly, for mergers that are 
subject to enhanced scrutiny, the stockholder vote that the 
Delaware Supreme Court held dispositive in Stroud was required by 
section 242 of the DGCL.88 The fact that section 242 required both 
prior board approval and subsequent stockholder approval did not 
alter the effect of the vote on the standard of review.89 
Further support for this view can be found in Williams v. Geier,90 
where the Delaware Supreme Court explained the importance of 
the organic vote on a charter amendment: 
Like the statutory scheme relating to mergers under 8 
Del.C. § 251, it is significant that two discrete corporate 
events must occur, in precise sequence, to amend the 
certificate of incorporation under 8 Del.C. § 242: First, the 
board of directors must adopt a resolution declaring the 
 
 85.  Id. at 81. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 83.  
 88.  Id. at 85. 
 89.  Id. at 83–84. Although enhanced scrutiny did not apply because of the 
stockholder vote, the Delaware Supreme Court treated the majority faction as a 
controlling stockholder and proceeded to review the recapitalization for entire 
fairness. Id. at 91. Consistent with other Delaware Supreme Court precedent, the 
Stroud court held that the fully informed stockholder vote shifted the burden of 
proving unfairness to the plaintiff. Id. at 90 (“Since there was no breach of any 
fiduciary duty in connection with the shareholder vote at the 1989 annual 
meeting, a fully informed majority of the shareholders adopted the Amendments 
and effectively ratified the board’s action. This shifts the burden of proof to the 
Strouds to prove that the transaction was unfair. They have utterly failed in that 
regard.” (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 
(Del. 1979); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Del. 1952); Saxe 
v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962); Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593 
(Del. Ch. 1958))). 
 90.  671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). 
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advisability of the amendment and calling for a 
stockholder vote. Second, a majority of the outstanding 
stock entitled to vote must vote in favor. The stockholders 
may not act without prior board action. Likewise, the 
board may not act unilaterally without stockholder 
approval. Therefore, the stockholders control their own 
destiny through informed voting.91 
The supreme court described this procedure as “the highest and 
best form of corporate democracy.”92 The Williams court did not 
discount the quality of the vote because it was an organic 
requirement of the DGCL.93 
As noted, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held on at least 
one occasion that an organic vote on a merger reduces the 
standard of review from enhanced scrutiny to the business 
judgment rule.94 More commonly, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
has simply deferred to the stockholder vote in situations where 
enhanced scrutiny applies. Numerous decisions have given 
deference to stockholder decision making when determining 
whether to issue an injunction against a pending merger before the 
stockholder vote has taken place.95 This is because 
 
 91.  Id. at 1381. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See id. at 1380–81. 
 94.  See In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (holding that fully informed stockholder vote on a merger triggered 
business judgment standard of review resulting in dismissal of claim that the 
directors of a corporation breached their duty of care in selling the corporation). 
 95.  See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 7144-VCG, 
2012 WL 729232, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (“Nonetheless, given that the 
meritorious allegations discussed above are remediable by damages, I find it in the 
best interests of the stockholders that they be given the opportunity to decide for 
themselves whether the Merger negotiated by Rosenkranz and the Director 
Defendants offers an acceptable price for their shares.”); In re El Paso Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434–35 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although the pursuit of a 
monetary damages award may not be likely to promise full relief, the record does 
not instill in me the confidence to deny, by grant of an injunction, El Paso’s 
stockholders from accepting a transaction that they may find desirable in current 
market conditions, despite the disturbing behavior that led to its final terms.”); 
In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 515 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“At the other 
end of the spectrum, where a selling Board’s alleged Revlon violations occur in the 
absence of another viable bid, this Court often finds injunctive relief to be 
inappropriate because it would be imprudent to terminate the only deal available, 
when the stockholders can make that decision for themselves.”); In re Dollar 
Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 618 (Del. Ch. 2010) (ruling that balance of 
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Delaware corporate law strives to give effect to business 
decisions approved by properly motivated directors and 
by informed, disinterested stockholders. By this means, 
our law seeks to balance the interest in promoting fair 
treatment of stockholders and the utility of avoiding 
judicial inquiries into the wisdom of business decisions. 
Thus, doctrines like ratification and acquiescence operate 
to keep the judiciary from second-guessing transactions 
when disinterested stockholders have had a fair 
opportunity to protect themselves by voting no.96 
Conversely, where there is coercion or a disclosure deficiency, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery will find irreparable harm and enjoin 
a transaction.97 “By issuing an injunction requiring additional 
 
harms tilted against injunction because stockholders could decide for themselves 
to vote deal down and take the chance of receiving an actionable higher bid); 
In re Netsmart Techs. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]hen 
[the] court is asked to enjoin a transaction and another higher-priced alternative 
is not immediately available, it has been appropriately modest about playing games 
with other people’s [(i.e., the stockholders’)] money.”); In re Pennaco Energy 
S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 715 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“After all, even when a 
sufficient merits showing is made by a plaintiff, this court is justifiably reluctant to 
enjoin a premium-generating transaction when no other option is available, 
except insofar as is necessary for the disclosure of additional information to 
permit stockholders to make an informed decision whether to tender.”).  
 96.  Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207.  
 97.  See, e.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civ. A. No. 3414-CC, 2008 WL 2224107, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (“A disclosure violation results in an irreparable 
injury, which implicates the jurisdiction of this Court.”), rev’d on other grounds, 
976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“[T]his court has typically 
found a threat of irreparable injury to exist when it appears stockholders may 
make an important voting decision on inadequate disclosures.”); Allen v. News 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 969-N, 2005 WL 415095, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2005) (“At this 
early stage, plaintiffs have demonstrated a ‘sufficiently colorable claim’ that the 
disclosures contained in News’ proxy materials are materially deficient or 
misleading and that there is a ‘possibility of a threatened irreparable injury,’ 
namely the loss of the ability by the Fox shareholders to have all pertinent 
information available at the time they decide whether to tender their shares into 
the exchange offer, if expedition is not granted.” (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v. 
Circon Corp., Civ. A. No. 15223, 1997 WL 33175025, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 
1997))); In re MONY Grp. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 18 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This 
disclosure violation threatens irreparable harm because stockholders may vote 
‘yes’ on a transaction they otherwise would have voted ‘no’ on if they had access to 
full or nonmisleading disclosures regarding the CICs.”); ODS Techs., L.P. v. 
Marshall, 832 A.2d 1254, 1262 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The threat of an [uninformed] 
stockholder vote constitutes irreparable harm.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders 
Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 452 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[I]rreparable injury is threatened when 
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disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice to think for 
themselves on full information, thereby vindicating their rights as 
stockholders to make important voting and remedial decisions 
based on their own economic self-interest.”98 If stockholder voting 
did not have any pertinence in situations where enhanced scrutiny 
applies, it would be odd for judges to defer to the stockholder vote 
or to insist that it be fully informed. Instead, in situations governed 
by enhanced scrutiny, “Delaware corporation law gives great weight 
to informed decisions made by an uncoerced electorate.”99 This 
deference implicitly recognizes the stockholders as qualified 
decision makers to which the court can defer. 
Taken together, these authorities make a strong case in favor 
of a stockholder vote lowering the standard of review from 
enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule. The vote should 
have this effect regardless of whether or not it is required by the 
DGCL.100 
IV. POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS 
The logical implications of a fully informed stockholder vote 
encounter potential impediments in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decisions in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation101 and 
Gantler v. Stephens.102 If read broadly, Santa Fe appears to hold that 
 
a stockholder might make a tender or voting decision on the basis of materially 
misleading or inadequate information.”). 
 98.  Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207. 
 99.  In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 100.  This article addresses only the doctrinal question of whether 
stockholders can act as qualified decision makers for purposes of changing the 
standard of review. It does not attempt to operationalize the doctrine by 
articulating the requirements for stockholders to act as qualified decision makers, 
such as whether the denominator should be the shares outstanding, versus only 
those voting, or whether shares held by particular individuals or entities, such as 
shares owned by the directors, should be excluded from the vote. See, e.g., In re 
John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 
3165613, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (holding that majority-of-the-minority 
vote that could be waived by a special committee and that required a majority of 
the shares voting rather than the shares outstanding would not affect the standard 
of review). At a minimum, the stockholder approval must be fully informed and 
free of any coercion. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502 
(Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d, – A.3d –, 2014 WL 996270 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014); Hammons 
Hotels, 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 n.38. 
 101.  669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
 102.  965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
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when enhanced scrutiny applies to a board decision, stockholder 
approval is not sufficient to reduce the standard of review to the 
business judgment rule, unless stockholders are given a specific, 
unbundled vote on the defensive measures otherwise subject to 
enhanced scrutiny. Gantler can be read as potentially limiting the 
effect of stockholder approval even further. An aggressive 
interpretation of Gantler might suggest that if a stockholder vote is 
required organically by the DGCL, it cannot alter the standard of 
review. 
These readings of Santa Fe and Gantler ignore their placement 
within a lengthy line of Delaware decisions that have attempted to 
correct confusing language about ratification that appeared in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom.103 The Delaware Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement in Gantler is best understood as rejecting earlier 
loose usages of ratification and limiting that term to the effect of a 
stockholder vote not otherwise required by the DGCL on a 
voidable act.104 Gantler leaves open the possibility that stockholder 
approval, even in the form of an organic vote required by the 
DGCL, will reduce the standard of review from enhanced scrutiny 
to the business judgment rule. 
A. Santa Fe 
Santa Fe grew out of a battle for control of Santa Fe Industries, 
a publicly traded Delaware corporation “with interests in railway 
transportation and petroleum pipelines.”105 In June 1994, Santa Fe 
entered into a merger agreement with Burlington Northern, Inc., 
another railroad company, that contemplated a stock-for-stock 
merger between the two corporations.106 The original transaction 
would have provided Santa Fe stockholders with Burlington stock 
with a market value of approximately $13.50 per share.107 The 
original merger agreement contained a force-the-vote provision 
and did not permit Santa Fe to terminate the merger agreement to 
 
 103.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by 
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713 n.54. 
 104.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713. 
 105.  Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 63.  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
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accept a superior proposal, although the board could change its 
merger recommendation.108 
Union Pacific Corporation then contacted Santa Fe and 
proposed a combination of its own.109 The Union Pacific proposal 
would have provided Santa Fe stockholders with Union Pacific 
stock with a market value of approximately $18.00 per share, 33.0% 
more than the Burlington proposal.110 The Santa Fe board rejected 
the proposal because of inadequacy of price, antitrust concerns, 
and the board’s determination that “Santa Fe was prevented by the 
First Merger Agreement from considering the Union Pacific offer. 
Santa Fe also refused to provide Union Pacific with non-public 
information to assess the value of Santa Fe.”111 Santa Fe and 
Burlington also responded by increasing the exchange ratio in 
their merger agreement so that Santa Fe stockholders would 
receive Burlington stock with a market value of approximately 
$17.00 per share.112 Union Pacific countered by increasing its offer 
to 0.407 shares of stock, worth approximately $20.00 per share, and 
proposing to establish a voting trust to address the antitrust risk.113 
When Santa Fe continued to refuse to engage, Union Pacific 
launched a cash tender offer for 57.1% of Santa Fe’s outstanding 
shares at $17.50 per share, to be followed by a second-step merger 
in which Santa Fe stockholders would receive 0.354 shares of Union 
Pacific stock.114 Union Pacific also received preliminary approval for 
its voting trust structure.115 The Santa Fe board nevertheless 
recommended that stockholders not tender their shares to Union 
Pacific, and Santa Fe’s CEO advised Union Pacific that “Santa Fe 
was not for sale.”116 
The Santa Fe board then adopted a rights plan with a 10.0% 
trigger.117 Santa Fe and Burlington also amended their merger 
agreement to (1) make the exchange ratio still more favorable to 
Santa Fe; (2) pay a fifty million dollar termination fee to 
 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 64. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
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Burlington if Santa Fe accepted a higher offer; and (3) commence 
a joint tender offer for up to 33.0% of Santa Fe’s common stock, 
with Burlington purchasing up to 13.0% and Santa Fe up to 20.0% 
of the Santa Fe shares.118 Burlington would own 16.0% of the 
outstanding shares of Santa Fe if the joint offer were fully 
completed.119 
Union Pacific again raised the price of its tender offer, this 
time to $18.50 per share.120 The Santa Fe board again recom-
mended against the offer, and Burlington and Santa Fe revised 
their merger agreement to allow Santa Fe to purchase up to ten 
million shares after the joint tender offer and before the merger.121 
Santa Fe also amended its rights plan to allow Allegheny 
Corporation to purchase up to 14.9% of Santa Fe shares without 
triggering the rights and announced that Allegheny had agreed to 
vote in favor of the Santa Fe-Burlington merger.122 The proposed 
Allegheny purchases, the joint tender offer, and the repurchase 
program would place 33.0% of the shares of Santa Fe in the hands 
of parties committed to the Burlington-Santa Fe merger.123 
Union Pacific and various Santa Fe stockholder plaintiffs sued 
in the Delaware Court of Chancery to challenge the actions of the 
Santa Fe board.124 The court of chancery twice declined to expedite 
the proceedings, initially ruling that the challenge came too soon, 
then subsequently ruling that the challenge came too late.125 
Stymied, Union Pacific withdrew its offer and dropped its lawsuit, 
leaving the stockholder litigants as the only plaintiffs.126 After the 
Santa Fe stockholders approved the merger, the plaintiffs amended 
their complaint to allege that the Santa Fe board had breached its 
fiduciary duties when reviewed under enhanced scrutiny and failed 
to disclose all material facts in connection with the merger vote.127 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 65. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Compare Union Pac. Corp. v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 13778, 1994 
WL 586924 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1994), with In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 
No. 13778, 1995 WL 54428 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1995). 
 126.  Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 65. 
 127.  Id.  
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The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint as 
failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted.128 The 
court of chancery found that the fully informed stockholder vote 
extinguished any claim that the board breached its duty of care.129 
The court of chancery held that the plaintiffs’ challenges to the 
actions taken by the Santa Fe board to defend against the 
competing Union Pacific deal implicated the duty of loyalty and 
were not extinguished by a fully informed stockholder vote.130 The 
court dismissed those claims on the merits on the grounds that 
enhanced scrutiny did not apply to a stock-for-stock merger.131 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the disclosure claims, thereby determining that the 
vote was fully informed.132 The plaintiffs did not appeal from the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling that the fully informed 
stockholder vote extinguished any claims that the Santa Fe board 
breached its duty of care.133 The defendants argued that the 
stockholder vote also extinguished any loyalty-based challenge to 
the Santa Fe board’s actions.134 The supreme court rejected this 
argument.135 
Initially, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to determine 
whether the actions of the Santa Fe board should be categorized as 
breaches of loyalty or care, stating “Revlon and Unocal and the 
duties of a Board when faced with a contest for corporate control 
do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty.”136 
The supreme court posited that “[i]n any event, categorizing these 
more specific duties as primarily arising from due care or loyalty 
would not be nearly as helpful in determining the effect of a fully-
informed stockholder vote as would an examination of their 
underlying purposes.”137 
On this latter point, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled as 
follows: 
 
 128.  Id. at 62. 
 129.  Id. at 67. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 68. 
 132.  Id. at 67. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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Permitting the vote of a majority of stockholders on a 
merger to remove from judicial scrutiny unilateral Board 
action in a contest for corporate control would frustrate 
the purposes underlying [enhanced scrutiny]. Board 
action which coerces stockholders to accede to a 
transaction to which they otherwise would not agree is 
problematic. Thus, enhanced judicial scrutiny of Board 
action is designed to assure that stockholders vote or 
decide to tender in an atmosphere free from undue 
coercion. 
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, 
the Santa Fe stockholders were not asked to ratify the 
Board’s unilateral decision to erect defensive measures 
against the Union Pacific offer. The stockholders were 
merely offered a choice between the Burlington Merger 
and doing nothing. The Santa Fe stockholders did not 
vote in favor of the precise measures under challenge in 
the complaint. Here, the defensive measures had 
allegedly already worked their effect before the 
stockholders had a chance to vote. In voting on the 
merger, the Santa Fe stockholders did not specifically vote 
in favor of the Rights Plan, the Joint Tender or the 
Termination Fee.138 
The supreme court concluded that “[s]ince the stockholders of 
Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive 
measures, we decline to find ratification in this instance.”139 
The Delaware Supreme Court then proceeded to review the 
actions of the Santa Fe board under the enhanced scrutiny 
standard.140 In examining the defensive actions taken by the Santa 
Fe board, the supreme court noted that “[t]his case differs from 
cases where the presumption of the business judgment rule 
attaches ab initio and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff 
must allege well-pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.”141 
The court quoted the following allegation from the complaint: 
The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care by proceeding with and 
completing the Joint Offer, which placed approximately 
16% ownership in the hands of BNI, adopting the Poison 
 
 138.  Id. at 68 (emphasis added).  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 71.  
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Pill and applying it in a discriminatory manner by 
exempting its application as to one bidder but main-
taining it as to all other interested parties, amending the 
Poison Pill to allow Allegheny to increase its ownership of 
Santa Fe to 14.9%, and authorizing the Repurchase 
Program.142 
The court then observed that: 
The complaint does not admit that the Board had 
proper grounds for its decision. Nor does the Board enjoy 
a presumption to that effect. The complaint does not 
adopt as true the facts set forth in the Proxy Statement. 
Thus, without benefit of the Joint Proxy, the Board 
cannot rely on any allegations of the complaint to meet its 
burden under Unocal and Unitrin to come forward with 
evidence supporting the reasonableness of its perception 
of the threat posed by Union Pacific and the 
proportionality of the response thereto.143 
Having made these preliminary rulings, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the 
complaint with the following caution: 
This case may very well illustrate the difficulty of 
expeditiously dispensing with claims seeking enhanced 
judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage where the complaint 
is not completely conclusory. . . . Here, there are well-
pleaded allegations on the Unocal claim. As the 
terminology of enhanced judicial scrutiny implies, boards 
can expect to be required to justify their decisionmaking, 
within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt 
defensive measures with implications for corporate 
control. This scrutiny will usually not be satisfied by 
resting on a defense motion merely attacking the 
pleadings.144 
The court remanded the case for further proceedings.145 
Under Santa Fe, it would appear that enhanced scrutiny will 
continue to apply “at the pleading stage,” notwithstanding a fully 
informed stockholder vote.146 It also would appear that the burden 
would remain on the directors “to justify their decisionmaking, 
 
 142.  Id. at 71–72.  
 143.  Id. at 72. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 73. 
 146.  Id. at 72. 
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within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive 
measures with implications for corporate control,” regardless of 
whether those defensive measures were separate from the merger 
agreement, such as the rights plan and joint tender, or part of the 
merger agreement itself, such as the termination fee.147 It would 
further seem that the pleading burden in such a case “differs from 
cases where the presumption of the business judgment rule 
attaches ab initio and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff 
must allege well-pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.”148 
Another of Santa Fe’s teachings would appear to be that “the 
duties of a Board when faced with a contest for corporate control 
do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty.”149 
The ambiguity results from the fact that the same types of defensive 
devices can be used for good (e.g., to enhance stockholder value) 
or for ill (e.g., as entrenchment measures or to steer a deal to a 
favored bidder), and that until there is an opportunity to hear 
evidence and take the case beyond the pleadings stage, it would be 
impossible for a court to make a motive-based distinction. 
Moreover, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff is entitled to all 
reasonably conceivable inferences, and Delaware Court of 
Chancery Rule 8(b) provides that motive can be pleaded 
generally.150 
The Delaware Supreme Court has never explicitly called into 
question, much less overruled these aspects of Santa Fe. As long as 
they remain good law, the case stands as an apparent impediment 
to the view that a fully informed stockholder vote on a merger 
otherwise subject to enhanced scrutiny causes the transaction to be 
reviewed under the business judgment rule. 
B. Gantler 
The Gantler decision arguably takes matters further than Santa 
Fe. Gantler involved a challenge to a reclassification that would 
uniquely benefit the incumbent board members of First Niles 
Financial, Inc.151 In 2003 the board of directors of First Niles 
 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id. at 71.  
 149.  Id. at 67.  
 150.  See DEL. CT. CH. R. 8(a); Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. 
Capital Holdings L.L.C., 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011). 
 151.  Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 704 (Del. 2009). 
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“decided that First Niles should put itself up for sale.”152 
Management disagreed, arguing against a sale and in favor of 
delisting the company from NASDAQ, reincorporating in 
Maryland, and continuing to operate as a standalone entity.153 The 
board initially declined to pursue management’s proposal, opting 
instead to retain an investment advisor and solicit third-party 
bids.154 
Three potential acquirers submitted bid letters.155 Farmers 
National Banc Corp. made a proposal, but stated in its bid letter 
that it had no plans to retain the First Niles board.156 Both the 
Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery 
cited this fact and noted that “the Board did not further pursue the 
Farmers’ offer.”157 Cortland Bancorp offered consideration of 
$18.00 per share, comprised of forty-nine percent in cash and 
fifty-one percent in stock.158 First Place Financial Corp. proposed an 
all-stock transaction valued at $18.00 to $18.50 per share.159 The 
investment advisor opined that all three bids were within the range 
of value suggested by its financial models.160 Management again 
proposed its privatization strategy.161 
The board instructed management to provide due diligence to 
Cortland and First Place, but management dragged its feet during 
due diligence.162 Cortland withdrew.163 First Place increased the 
value of exchange offer.164 The board’s financial advisor described 
the offer “in positive terms.”165 According to the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision, “[w]ithout any discussion or deliberation . . . the 
 
 152.  Id. at 700. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. Neither decision describes the terms of the Farmers proposal. The 
complaint did not describe it either. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 701. 
 165.  Id.  
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Board voted 4 to 1 to reject that offer.”166 Management then 
renewed its privatization proposal in modified form.167 
Under the new privatization proposal, holders of 300 or fewer 
shares would have their shares converted into Series A Preferred 
Stock on a one-to-one basis.168 The Series A Preferred Stockholders 
would receive a higher dividend than the common stock holders, 
but would not have any preference on liquidation.169 The Series A 
Preferred Stockholders also would not have any voting rights 
except in connection with a sale of the company.170 Management 
argued that the privatization proposal 
was the best method to privatize the Company because it 
allowed maximum flexibility for future capital manage-
ment activities, such as open market purchases and 
negotiated buy-backs. Moreover, First Niles could achieve 
the Reclassification without having to buy back shares in a 
fair market appraisal.171 
Several months later, the board approved the reclassification 
proposal substantially in the form proposed by management.172 
Because the reclassification required a charter amendment, 
section 242 of the DGCL mandated that the proposal receive 
stockholder approval.173 A majority of the outstanding shares 
(57.30%) approved the transaction.174 After taking judicial notice of 
the voting counts, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that 
50.28% of the unaffiliated shares voted in favor.175 For a range of 
reasons, including the doctrine of ratification, the court of 
chancery held that the complaint challenging the reclassification 
failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.176 
 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Id.  
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id.  
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id. at 702. 
 173.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014). 
 174.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 703. 
 175.  Id.; see also Gantler v. Stephens, Civ. A. No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124, 
at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008) (calculating 50.28% figure as a percentage of 
the unaffiliated shares outstanding). 
 176.  See Gantler, 2008 WL 401124, at *23. 
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ratification ruling.177 The Delaware 
Supreme Court found that the complaint pled material 
misrepresentations, but also held that “because a shareholder vote 
was required to amend the certificate of incorporation, that 
approving vote could not also operate to ‘ratify’ the challenged 
conduct of the interested directors.”178 
Justice Jacobs authored the appellate decision.179 While serving 
as a Vice Chancellor in 1995, Justice Jacobs had authored another 
influential opinion, known as Wheelabrator II, that identified various 
difficulties in Delaware’s stockholder approval jurisprudence.180 
The Wheelabrator II opinion traced these difficulties181 to the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom, where the 
defendant directors argued to the Delaware Supreme Court that 
“the stockholders’ ‘overwhelming’ vote approving the Pritzker 
Merger Agreement had the legal effect of curing any failure of the 
Board to reach an informed business judgment in its approval of 
the merger.”182 Agreeing with this legal proposition but not its 
application on the facts, the Delaware Supreme Court observed 
that “[t]he parties tacitly agree that a discovered failure of the 
Board to reach an informed business judgment in approving the 
merger constitutes a voidable, rather than void, act.”183 Unfortu-
nately, this language confusingly implied that a care-based 
challenge to a decision that the board undeniably had the power to 
make implicated the quite different concepts of voidness and 
voidability. The Van Gorkom decision reinforced this implication by 
stating that “[h]ence, the merger can be sustained, notwith-
standing the infirmity of the Board’s action, if its approval by 
majority vote of the shareholders is found to have been based on 
an informed electorate.”184 But as Wheelabrator II explained, a more 
 
 177.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 699. 
 178.  Id. at 712. 
 179.  Id. at 698. 
 180.  See Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 181.  Id. at 1200. 
 182.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by 
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713 n.54.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id. In fairness to the Van Gorkom court, there was linguistic precedent for 
using the concepts of voidness and voidability to refer to fiduciary breaches. In its 
1979 decision in Michelson v. Duncan, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that 
a board decision made in bad faith and not in the best interests of the corporation 
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fundamental problem with Van Gorkom was simply the terminology 
that the Delaware Supreme Court used when discussing the 
effectiveness of the vote, which repeatedly included the terms 
“ratify” and “ratification.”185 
In Wheelabrator II, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs criticized Van 
Gorkom’s imprecise use of the term “shareholder ratification” and 
argued for the need to distinguish between (1) ratification in its 
“‘classic’ or paradigmatic form,” which “describes the situation 
where shareholders approve board action that, legally speaking, 
could be accomplished without any shareholder approval,” and 
(2) “the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was statutorily 
required for the transaction to have legal existence.”186 Justice 
Jacobs nevertheless implied that a stockholder vote would have the 
 
was “void.” 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979). Delaware Court of Chancery 
decisions have picked up on this language by describing decisions tainted by 
breaches of the duty of loyalty as “void” and decisions tainted by breaches of the 
duty of care as “voidable.” See, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1114 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (citing Michelson and Van Gorkom in support of this distinction); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547, 
at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999) (citing Michelson). I personally understand the 
concepts of voidness and voidability to be directed towards whether the corporate 
actor had authority to make the challenged decision under the DGCL, charter, or 
bylaws. If the authority exists, then a fiduciary challenge could result in an order 
rescinding the action and declaring it invalid, but it would not be either voidable 
or void. The concepts are inapt for fiduciary analysis, where the question is not 
whether the board had the power to act, but rather whether the board exercised 
its power equitably. Put differently, using Professor Berle’s concept of “twice 
tested” actions, the issues of voidness and voidability go to the first (legal) test, not 
to the second (equitable) test. See generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[I]n every case, corporate 
action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the 
existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat 
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise 
of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary.”). 
 185.  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890. The Delaware Supreme Court wrote: 
   The settled rule in Delaware is that “where a majority of fully 
informed stockholders ratify action of even interested directors, an 
attack on the ratified transaction normally must fail.” The question of 
whether shareholders have been fully informed such that their vote 
can be said to ratify director action, “turns on the fairness and 
completeness of the proxy materials submitted by the management to 
the . . . shareholders.”  
Id. (quoting Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593 (Del. Ch. 1958); Michelson, 
407 A.2d at 220). 
 186.  Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201–03, n.4 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
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same legal effect “irrespective of whether that shareholder vote is 
legally required for the transaction to attain legal existence.”187 In 
other words, although different terminology should be used to 
describe the legal effect, an organic vote could change the standard 
of review. 
In Gantler, quoting extensively from his decision in 
Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs observed on behalf of the Delaware 
Supreme Court that the doctrine of ratification “might be thought 
to lack coherence because the decisions addressing the effect of 
shareholder ‘ratification’” had used the term in different ways.188 
There was ratification in its “classic” form, which described a 
situation where stockholders approved board action that, “legally 
speaking, could be accomplished without any shareholder 
approval.”189 But there were also cases that used the term “to 
describe the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was 
statutorily required for the transaction to have legal existence.”190 
Speaking for the unanimous court, Justice Jacobs stated that 
going forward, only “classic” ratification would be recognized: 
To restore coherence and clarity to this area of our 
law, we hold that the scope of the shareholder ratification 
doctrine must be limited to its so-called “classic” form; 
that is, to circumstances where a fully informed 
shareholder vote approves director action that does not 
legally require shareholder approval in order to become 
legally effective. Moreover, the only director action or 
conduct that can be ratified is that which the shareholders 
are specifically asked to approve. With one exception, the 
“cleansing” effect of such a ratifying shareholder vote is to 
subject the challenged director action to business 
judgment rule, as opposed to “extinguishing” the claim 
altogether (i.e., obviating all judicial review of the 
challenged action).191 
The Gantler decision expressly overruled Van Gorkom “[t]o the 
extent that [it] holds otherwise.”192 
 
 187.  Id. at 1201 n.4. 
 188.  Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009) (quoting 
Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4). 
 189.  Id. (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4). 
 190.  Id. (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4). 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. at 713 n.54.  
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Consistent with his discussion in Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs 
explained that nothing in Gantler “should be read as altering the 
well-established principle that void acts such as fraud, gift, waste 
and ultra vires acts cannot be ratified by a less than unanimous 
shareholder vote.”193 Justice Jacobs also explained that nothing in 
Gantler was “intended to affect or alter our jurisprudence governing 
the effect of an approving vote of disinterested shareholders under 
[section 144].”194 
Applying these principles, the Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the 
challenge to the reclassification: 
The Court of Chancery held that although Count III 
of the complaint pled facts establishing that the 
Reclassification Proposal was an interested transaction not 
entitled to business judgment protection, the 
shareholders’ fully informed vote “ratifying” that Proposal 
reinstated the business judgment presumption. That 
ruling was legally erroneous . . . . [T]he ratification 
doctrine does not apply to transactions where shareholder 
approval is statutorily required. Here, the Reclassification 
could not become legally effective without a statutorily 
mandated shareholder vote approving the amendment to 
First Niles’ certificate of incorporation. . . . Therefore, the 
approving shareholder vote did not operate as a 
“ratification” of the challenged conduct in any legally 
meaningful sense.195 
The supreme court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that 
a majority of the board was interested in the reclassification, that 
entire fairness therefore applied, and that the complaint could not 
be dismissed.196 
If read in isolation, Gantler might be construed to suggest by 
negative implication that an organic vote required by the DGCL 
does not have any effect on an underlying fiduciary challenge or 
the applicable standard of review. If interpreted in that fashion, 
then Gantler could be seen as broadening Santa Fe, rather than 
limiting it, so that after Gantler, the stockholder vote addressed in 
Santa Fe would not even cleanse a challenge to the merger price. 
 
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 714.  
 196.  Id. 
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C. A Quarter Century of Effort at Clarification 
Rather than being seen as holding that an organic vote cannot 
affect the standard of review, Gantler should be seen as a definitive 
step in a quarter century of judicial effort to clarify Van Gorkom’s 
loose language about stockholder ratification. As then-Vice 
Chancellor Jacobs explained in Wheelabrator II, Delaware decisions 
addressing stockholder voting sometimes conflated separate issues 
or deployed unclear terminology, such as (1) using the term 
“ratification” to refer to an organic vote, (2) referring to board 
decisions involving a breach of fiduciary duty as void, (3) importing 
concepts and procedures from the safe harbor of section 144, and 
(4) speaking in terms of claims being extinguished or barred in 
their entirety.197 In Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs distinguished 
between stockholder votes that were not required for the corporate 
action to be effective, which he termed “classic ratification,” and 
organic votes, which should not be termed ratification.198 Again, 
and critically, the Wheelabrator II decision indicated that a 
stockholder vote would have the same legal effect “irrespective of 
whether that shareholder vote is legally required for the transaction 
to attain legal existence.”199 
After Wheelabrator II, the Delaware Supreme Court and the 
Delaware Court of Chancery made attempts to address the 
confusion in this area. In Williams v. Geier,200 the Delaware Supreme 
Court sought to eliminate any confusion over the use of the term 
“ratification.” Plainly cognizant of Wheelabrator II, which it cited, the 
Delaware Supreme Court carefully distinguished between 
(1) “cases . . . where stockholders are called upon to ratify action 
which may involve a transaction with an interested director or 
where the transaction approved by the board may otherwise be 
voidable,” and (2) cases involving “the effect of corporate action 
which, in order to become operative, requires and receives both 
approval by the board of directors and stockholders.”201 The 
Williams case involved a challenge to a charter amendment, so the 
Delaware Supreme Court “put to one side” the first category of 
cases, which it described as “not relevant” and “entirely 
 
 197.  Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1200–05 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 198.  Id. at 1201 n.4. 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).  
 201.  Id. at 1379. 
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different.”202 In a footnote, the Williams court took on the question 
of terminology: 
The term “ratification” is, in the dictionary sense, a 
generic term connoting official approval, confirmation or 
sanction. Thus, it is not incorrect to consider broadly that 
stockholder approval in either sense may be called 
“ratification.” But where the organic act (such as those 
occurring under Section 242) necessarily requires 
stockholder approval for its effectuation, it may be 
preferable to employ the statutory usage—viz., “to vote in 
favor” or, simply, stockholder approval.203 
The Delaware Supreme Court did not, however, take action beyond 
expressing this cautionary note. 
Next came Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Lewis v. Vogelstein.204 
Like Williams and Wheelabrator II, Lewis began by distinguishing the 
stockholder vote at issue from “those instances in which 
shareholder votes are a necessary step in authorizing a 
transaction.”205 The Lewis case challenged a stock option plan 
under which the members of the board of Mattel, Inc. would 
receive options.206 The board indisputably had the power to adopt 
the plan without a stockholder vote, but the board had obtained a 
vote regardless.207 Chancellor Allen made clear that “the law of 
ratification as here discussed has no direct bearing on shareholder 
action to amend a certificate of incorporation or bylaws; nor does 
that law bear on shareholder votes necessary to authorize a merger, 
a sale of substantially all the corporation’s assets, or to dissolve the 
enterprise.”208 
Initially, Chancellor Allen held that absent the vote, the 
standard of review would be entire fairness with the burden of 
proof on the defendants.209 He then explained the four possible 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. at 1379 n.24.  
 204.  699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 205.  Id. at 334.  
 206.  Id. at 329. 
 207.  Id. at 330. 
 208.  Id. at 334 (comparing this case to Williams, 671 A.2d 1368). 
 209.  Id. at 333 (“As the Plan contemplates grants to the directors that 
approved the Plan and who recommended it to the shareholders, we start by 
observing that it constitutes self-dealing that would ordinarily require that the 
directors prove that the grants involved were, in the circumstances, entirely fair to 
the corporation.”).  
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effects that the stockholder vote on an interested transaction could 
have: 
First, one might conclude that an effective shareholder 
ratification acts as a complete defense to any charge of 
breach of duty. Second, one might conclude that the effect 
of such ratification is to shift the substantive test on 
judicial review of the act from one of fairness . . . to one of 
waste. Third, one might conclude that the ratification 
shifts the burden of proof of unfairness to plaintiff, but 
leaves that shareholder-protective test in place. Fourth, one 
might conclude (perhaps because of great respect for the 
collective action disabilities that attend shareholder action 
in public corporations) that shareholder ratification offers 
no assurance of assent of a character that deserves judicial 
recognition.210 
The Chancellor observed that “[e]xcepting the fourth of these 
effects, there are cases in this jurisdiction that reflect each of these 
approaches.”211 
After broadly surveying the concept of ratification and its 
origins, Chancellor Allen held that the effect of the stockholder 
vote approving the option plan was to extinguish any challenge to 
the plan other than on grounds of waste.212 He nevertheless denied 
the motion to dismiss, finding that the directors’ grants of options 
to themselves seemed at the pleadings stage “sufficiently unusual to 
require the court to refer to evidence before making an 
adjudication of their validity and consistency with fiduciary duty.”213 
 
 210.  Id. at 334.  
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 338.  
 213.  Id. at 339. Notably, Chancellor Allen’s list of alternatives in Lewis v. 
Vogelstein did not identify the possibility that the stockholder vote could change the 
standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, at which 
point the plaintiff would have the burden to rebut one of its presumptions. 
Presumably this was because the plaintiffs in Lewis easily could have rebutted the 
presumption of loyalty: because all of the directors would receive options under 
the plan they approved, they were interested in that decision. If the effect of the 
vote was merely to restore the business judgment rule but then to allow the 
plaintiff to overcome the rule by pleading the same director interest that was 
disclosed to stockholders, then the vote would have no effect at all.  
It might seem that this analytical problem could be sidestepped by requiring 
the plaintiff to plead a different basis, other than the disclosed conflicts, to rebut 
the presumptions of the business judgment rule. In other words, to give the vote 
meaning, a plaintiff would not be able to rely on the disclosed conflict. But if the 
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Wheelabrator II, Williams, and Lewis settled for a time the 
taxonomy of stockholder approval under Delaware law. The cases 
enforced the traditional meaning of ratification, limited it to 
voluntary votes, and sharply distinguished voluntary votes from 
organic votes. But the cases did not hold that an organic vote would 
have no effect. To the contrary, Wheelabrator II recognized that a 
stockholder vote would have the same effect “irrespective of 
whether that shareholder vote is legally required for the transaction 
to attain legal existence.”214 
The next generation of Delaware Court of Chancery opinions, 
however, did not maintain the careful distinction in terminology.215 
In General Motors Class H, the court of chancery declined to 
distinguish between a voluntary vote and an organic vote.216 The 
case involved a vote on a charter amendment pursuant to section 
242 of the DGCL, but the opinion used the language of ratification 
and described the organic vote as operating to “bar” claims for 
breaches of care and loyalty.217 Similarly in Harbor Finance Partners v. 
 
plaintiff would have to identify an undisclosed conflict, then the vote would not 
have any effect in the first place because it would not be fully informed. 
Consequently, the practical effect of restoring business judgment review is to 
change the standard of review to one of waste, as Chancellor Allen’s list suggested. 
 214.  Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 215.  See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (addressing effect of organic merger vote and stating “[w]hen disinterested 
stockholders make a mature decision about their economic self-interest, judicial 
second-guessing is almost completely circumscribed by the doctrine of 
ratification”); In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 28-N, 2006 
WL 2403999, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (considering merger and explaining 
that “outside the Lynch context, proof that an informed, non-coerced majority of 
the disinterested stockholders approved an interested transaction has the effect of 
invoking business judgment rule protection for the transaction and, as a practical 
matter, insulating the transaction from revocation and its proponents from 
liability”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(using language of ratification in holding that fully informed stockholder vote 
approving a merger otherwise subject to enhanced scrutiny restored business 
judgment standard of review and resulted in dismissal of complaint); Solomon v. 
Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115–17 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining that when a 
transaction requires an organic vote under the DGCL, “shareholder ratification 
can have a penetrating legal effect,” to wit “an informed and uncoerced 
shareholder vote on the matter provides an independent reason to maintain 
business judgment protection for the board’s acts”). 
 216.  In re General Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 612–13 (Del. 
Ch. 1999). 
 217.  Id. at 616. The General Motors Class H decision distinguished Santa Fe as a 
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Huizenga,218 the court of chancery gave ratifying effect to an organic 
vote required by section 251.219 
The author of both decisions, then-Vice Chancellor Strine, 
noted in Harbor Finance that he was “keenly aware that ‘classic 
ratification’ involves the ‘voluntary addition of an independent 
layer of shareholder approval in circumstances where such 
approval is not legally required.’”220 Nevertheless, “[f]or want of 
better nomenclature” he used the term to describe “a stockholder 
vote sufficient to invoke the business judgment rule standard of 
review,” which would include a statutorily required stockholder 
vote.221 
Against this background, Gantler appears to be an effort to 
return to the taxonomy of Wheelabrator II, Williams, and Lewis by 
reestablishing the sharp distinction in terminology that was 
suggested in Wheelabrator II. Only the effect of a voluntary vote is 
properly termed “ratification,” and the effect of the vote is to 
“subject the challenged director action to business judgment 
review.”222 Read in this fashion, Gantler does not imply that an 
organic vote has no effect. It rather recognizes that whatever the 
effect may be, it is not properly called ratification. As in Williams, 
voluntary vote cases and organic vote cases are “entirely different” 
and “not relevant” to each other.223 
By contrast, if Gantler actually held that an organic vote cannot 
affect the standard of review, then the decision would have 
represented a radical break with precedent. For the price of 
clarifying the linguistic confusion that Van Gorkom created, the 
decision would have overruled the parade of precedents—
including Wheelabrator II—that held that an organic vote does affect 
the standard of review. Nothing about Gantler suggests an intention 
 
case involving a situation where “the defendants are attempting to use the 
stockholder vote to insulate themselves from responsibility for decisions not 
directly at issue in the vote.” Id. at 617. The decision also distinguished situations 
where there are “concerns about ‘implied coercion’ such as has been found to 
exist where a controlling stockholder dominates the corporation.” Id. 
 218.  751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999).  
 219.  Id. at 881.  
 220.  Id. at 900 n.78 (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201–02, n.4 (Del. 
Ch. 1995)).  
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009). 
 223.  Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996); see supra text 
accompanying notes 201–03. 
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to overrule so many cases or such a significant aspect of Delaware 
doctrine. To the contrary, it appears that Gantler intended to 
elevate the trial court level discussion in Wheelabrator II to the status 
of authoritative Delaware Supreme Court precedent. 
Gantler’s treatment of Santa Fe similarly indicates that the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not intend to suggest that an organic 
vote cannot affect the standard of review. Recall that in Santa Fe, 
the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that the organic vote on the 
Santa Fe-Burlington merger provided grounds for dismissing the 
complaint to the extent it alleged claims that the board breached 
its duty of care.224 If the Gantler court intended that an organic vote 
could never affect the standard of review, then the Gantler decision 
would have overruled Santa Fe on this issue, just as it overruled Van 
Gorkom. Instead, the Gantler decision cited Santa Fe with approval in 
support of the proposition that “the only director action or 
conduct that can be ratified is that which the shareholders are 
specifically asked to approve.”225 In a footnote, the Gantler decision 
stated: 
We previously so held in [Santa Fe], which involved a 
claim that by adopting defensive measures to block an 
unsolicited takeover bid, the directors of the target 
corporation breached their fiduciary duties. The Court of 
Chancery held that that claim had been extinguished by 
the “ratifying” shareholder vote approving a subsequent 
merger of the target corporation. Reversing that ruling, 
this Court held that “[s]ince the stockholders of Santa Fe 
merely voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive 
measures, we decline to find ratification in this 
instance.”226 
The Gantler court did not hold that the Santa Fe decision’s analysis 
of the effect of the organic approval required for the merger was 
otherwise wrong. 
Most tellingly, Justice Jacobs included a footnote in Gantler that 
took pains to explain the confirmatory nature of the decision: “This 
Opinion clarifies that ‘ratification’ legally describes only corporate 
action where stockholder approval is not statutorily required for its 
effectuation.”227 Consistent with the clarifying nature of the 
 
 224.  In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995).  
 225.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713. 
 226.  Id. at 713 n.53 (quoting Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68). 
 227.  Id. at 714 n.55. 
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decision, Justice Jacobs went out of his way to explain that the 
Gantler opinion did not alter Delaware law regarding the 
unanimous approval standard for ratifying fraud, gift, waste, or 
ultra vires acts, nor stockholder approval jurisprudence under 
section 144.228 It would be strange to think that despite these 
careful efforts, the Delaware Supreme Court intended to hold that 
stockholder approval of a merger could have no effect on the 
standard of review. Subsequent Delaware Court of Chancery 
decisions have not interpreted Gantler as having this implication.229 
Viewed from this perspective, Gantler is primarily a decision 
about terminology—which is not to minimize its importance. 
Language matters greatly in law. As Chancellor Allen once noted, 
“in the law, to an extent present in few other human institutions, 
there may be in the long run as much importance ascribed to the 
reasoning said to justify action, as there is in the actions 
themselves.”230 On two other occasions, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has gone out of its way to alter terminology. In Stroud v. 
Grace, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the term “duty of 
candor,” which Delaware decisions frequently deployed, finding 
that it had “no well accepted meaning in the disclosure context” 
and that “[i]ts use is both confusing and imprecise.”231 The Stroud 
opinion instructed courts to instead “speak of a duty of disclosure 
based on a materiality standard.”232 In Arnold v. Society for Saving 
Bancorp,233 the Delaware Supreme Court made a similar effort to 
squash colloquial phrases like “Revlon duties” and “Revlon-land,” 
 
 228.  Id. at 713 n.54. 
 229.  See In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 663 n.34 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“[I]t is plain that, when disinterested approval of a sale to an 
arm’s-length buyer is given by a majority of stockholders who have had the chance 
to consider whether or not to approve a transaction for themselves, there is a long 
and sensible tradition of giving deference to the stockholders’ voluntary decision, 
invoking the business judgment rule standard of review, and limiting any 
challenges to the difficult argument that the transaction constituted waste.”); 
In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 793 n.113 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (expressing the view that in the absence of a majority stockholder or de 
facto controller, “the approval of an uncoerced, disinterested electorate of a 
merger (including a sale) would have the effect of invoking the business judgment 
rule standard of review”). 
 230.  In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, 
at *1156 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989). 
 231.  606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994). 
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describing them as inappropriate references “to the enhanced 
scrutiny courts accord to certain types of transactions.”234 Gantler 
appears to be a similar attempt to clarify an area of the law by 
starting with terminology. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Delaware decisions identify certain specific, recurring, and 
readily identifiable situations that call for enhanced scrutiny—
Delaware’s intermediate standard of review. The Delaware courts’ 
recognition that particular scenarios require more careful judicial 
review than business judgment deference does not trump the 
foundational premise of judicial deference to a qualified corporate 
decision maker. If a fully informed and disinterested stockholder 
majority votes in favor of a transaction otherwise subject to 
enhanced scrutiny, then the business judgment rule should 
become the operative standard of review. This is true regardless of 
whether the vote is an organic requirement of the DGCL or a 
voluntary addition. Any complaint challenging such a transaction 
should no longer benefit from enhanced scrutiny’s reasonableness 
standard or the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants. 
Instead, the plaintiff should be required to plead facts sufficient to 
overcome the business judgment rule’s presumptions. 
 
 
 234.  Id. at 1289 n.40. 
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